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and -412(a) (i) (1978) (R. 28-29). After a trial, a jury found 
defendants guilty of burglary, theft, and infraction criminal 
trespass (R. 250-55)• It returned verdicts of not guilty on the 
misdemeanor criminal trespass charges (R. 256-57). The trial 
court then sentenced defendants to identical terms in the Utah 
State Prison of one to fifteen years for theft, zero to five 
years for burglary, and three months for criminal trespass* — 
the sentences to run concurrently (R. 291-96). Subsequently, 
this Court granted defendants1 applications for a certificate of 
probable cause. £££ State v. Neeley. 707 P.2d 647 (Utah 1985). 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
The State agrees with defendants' recitation of the 
facts pertinent to the charges against them and their pretrial 
motions to recuse and to remand. Any additional factual 
development on those aspects of the case appears in the argument 
portion of this brief. 
At trial, the parties presented contradictory evidence. 
Below is a summary of the testimony that was critical to each 
party1s case. 
The State1s chief witness, David Bittner, testified to 
the following facts. He had become acquainted with both 
defendants while weightlifting at a particular gym. Shortly 
before March 19, 1983, he discussed his work with silver at a 
1 Although defendants do not challenge their sentences for 
criminal trespass, the three month sentence each received appears 
to be in violation of the law. £fi£ UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-3-205(1) 
(1978) (which provides that a person convicted of an infraction 
cannot be imprisoned)• 
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company named Spectra Symbol in Salt Lake City with defendant 
Neeley (R. 342-47)• Around midnight on March 19, Neeley arrived 
at Bittner's residence, asked him if he had any gloves, and then 
said, "Let's go," Bittner went with Neeley and got into a pickup 
truck parked outside which contained defendant Belt and a third 
person. The four of them then drove to Spectra Symbol where 
defendants and Bittner entered the building after Belt opened the 
front door with a key. They searched for about an hour before 
finding a container of silver. Pursuant to Neeley1s 
instructions, Bittner took a small sample of the silver which 
would later be tested for purity. No other silver was taken. 
Before leaving the building, defendants looked through the 
receptionist's desk after Neeley had picked the lock on it. They 
took nothing from it, simply noting its contents which included a 
cash box (R. 347-60). 
One week later, Bittner told the owner of Spectra 
Symbol, David Marriot, about his entry into the building with 
defendants. The following day, he and Marriot went to the Salt 
Lake City Police Department and told two detectives about the 
incident. Between that time and April 11, 1983, Bittner 
maintained nearly daily contact with the police who gave him $350 
in cash during that period. On April 10, the police asked 
Bittner whether defendants would return to Spectra Symbol if more 
silver were on the premises. After responding in the 
affirmative, Bittner, in accordance with a request from the 
police, contacted Neeley that evening and informed him that 
Spectra Symbol had just received a shipment of supplies (R. 361-
71). 
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Subsequently on the evening of the 10th, defendants 
arrived at Bittner1s residence and took him to Spectra Symbol. 
Once there, the three entered the building after defendants had 
opened a door, apparently with a key. After retrieving his box 
of "lock picks" that Bittner had carried inside, Neeley 
instructed Bittner to remain in front and watch for the police. 
Defendants went to the back of the building for a period of time, 
then returned to the receptionist's desk where Neeley picked the 
lock on the drawer, took money from the cash box, and gave it to 
Bittner with directions to put it in his pockets. As Bittner and 
defendants, both of whom were carrying boxes, left the building 
through a side door, they were confronted by the police. All 
along, Bittner was aware of the police's presence (R. 373-83). 
During his examination at trial, Bittner admitted to a 
prior felony conviction, a drug problem, parole violations, and a 
perjurious denial at defendants1 preliminary hearing of having 
received monetary compensation from the police (R. 384, 450, 
465). He also indicated that he had been granted immunity from 
prosecution for testifying in defendants1 case (R. 396-98). 
Testimony from other State witnesses, including Spectra 
Symbol's receptionist, David Marriot (its owner), and several 
police officers, established that the receptionist's desk had 
been discovered in disarray around March 19 (R. 495, 509), 
Bittner had talked with Marriot about defendants' and his entry 
into the building on the 19th (R. 520), the police—after Bittner 
and Marriot came to them—had arranged the situation which led to 
defendants' apprehension for burglary and theft at Spectra Symbol 
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on April 11, 1983 (R. 521-24, 544-57, 594-603), and on the day 
after defendants' apprehension numerous items were discovered out 
of place and stacked near the side door through which defendants 
had attempted to exit Spectra Symbol on April 11 (R. 628-32, 653-
57) . 
Defendants took the stand at trial and related similar 
accounts of what had occurred on March 19 and April 11 at Spectra 
Symbol. Each denied that he was at the building on the 19th. 
They further testified that, on the 11th, they had gone to 
Spectra Symbol, at Bittner's request, to help him get into his 
locker and dispose of some marijuana he feared was there and 
would be discovered by his parole officer. According to 
defendants, Bittner told them he was a supervisor at Spectra 
Symbol and had permission to be on the premises at any time 
(R. 720-21, 726, 731, 774-75, 780, 790-91, 796). Finally, both 
denied moving any items while they were there (R. 736, 800). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
Although the trial judge in defendants' case had 
previously been involved as the district attorney in criminal 
prosecutions of defendant Belt, under the great weight of 
authority that fact alone was not sufficient to require 
disqualification. Therefore, there being no showing of actual 
bias or prejudice on the part of the judge at trial, reversible 
error did not occur when he refused to recuse himself. 
The State agrees with defendants that they were 
entitled to a complete transcript of their preliminary hearing in 
order to prepare a defense for trial. However, in the absence of 
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any showing of prejudice due to not having a complete transcript, 
defendants are not entitled to reversals of their convictions. 
Because defendants did not properly request a lesser 
included instruction on criminal trespass for the burglary charge 
against them, they are precluded from arguing on appeal that the 
trial court erroneously denied the requested instruction. In any 
event, because the evidence would not support one, defendants 
were not entitled to a lesser included instruction on criminal 
trespass. 
Finally, defendants fail to show that the trial court 
violated the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-7 (1982). 
Therefore, the court's refusal to give defendants' requested 




REVERSIBLE ERROR DID NOT OCCUR WHEN THE TRIAL 
JUDGE REFUSED TO RECUSE HIMSELF. 
Prior to trial, defendants moved to have Judge Banks 
removed as the trial judge on the ground that he was legally 
biased due to involvement as the prosecutor in four previous 
criminal prosecutions against defendant Belt. The State 
stipulated that Judge Banks had personally appeared as the 
attorney for the State on September 8, 1964 for Belt's guilty 
plea in the case of State of Utah v. Lynn Belt and Gaylen Jones 
(R. 144). As noted in defendants' brief, their motion had been 
referred to a judge other than Judge Banks on two different 
occasions pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) and (d) (UTAH CODE 
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ANN. S§ 77-35-29 (c) and (d) (1982)) and was twice denied (R. 85, 
133). 
Although lack of timeliness was an alternative basis 
upon which defendants1 recusal motion was denied by the second 
reviewing judge (R. 133) , the State agrees with defendants that 
the motion, when originally filed, was timely, and therefore the 
merits of the recusal issue should be addressed on appeal. 
Defendants argue thatf because Judge Banks had signed 
informations and personally appeared at an arraignment as the 
prosecuting attorney in cases involving defendant Belt some 
fifteen to twenty years prior to the instant case, he should not 
have presided over their trial and they are entitled to 
reversals. Assuming that both defendants are on equal footing to 
advance this argument,2 their claim is contrary to the clear 
weight of authority. 
Under the version of Article VIII, section 13 of the 
Utah Constitution in place at the time of defendants1 trial (£££ 
Utah Code Ann., Replacement Volume 1A, 1971 ed.) and Utah R. 
Crim. P. 29(c) and (d), it is clear that a judge who has been 
connected with a party as counsel in the case before him or her 
should order a recusal. £&& AlaQ UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-7-1(3) 
(1977); Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah. 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 
1985)* However, those provisions do not require recusal when the 
judge was involved as a prosecutor in a previous, unrelated 
2 Defendants were tried together, and it is reasonable to assume 
that, if the trial judge were biased against one of them, he 
could very well be biased against both. 
-7-
prosecution of the same defendant. This i s in accord with the 
general ly accepted view in t h i s country. Although a few courts 
have held that a judge was d i s q u a l i f i e d from s i t t i n g in a case 
involving a defendant whom the judge had prosecuted on d i f f erent 
charges in a previous capacity as a government attorney because 
of the appearance of prejudice , e . g . , United S ta te s v. Z e r i l l i , 
328 F.Supp. 706 (D.Cal. 1971); People v. C o r e l l i . 41 App. Div.2d 
939, 343 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1973), the majority, and b e t t e r , view i s 
otherwise. £££., e . g . , Jenkins v. Bordenkircher. 611 F.2d 162 
(6th Cir . 1979) (refusing t o adopt a £ £ i .as rule that a judge may 
never preside at a t r i a l where he has had previous contact with 
the defendant as a prosecutor on t o t a l l y unrelated criminal 
charges); Jordon v. S ta te . 274 Ark. 572, 626 S.W.2d 947 (1982) 
(because t r i a l judge had previously prosecuted burglary defendant 
in three of h i s four prior felony prosecutions did not d i squal i fy 
judge); AnnGt., 16 A.L.R. 4th 550, 566-68 (1982 & Supp. 1985). 
The common thread running through most dec i s i ons " i s that recusal 
w i l l be required only when the judge i s asked t o hear the same 
case in which he, at some prior s tage , . • . was the prosecutor." 
Commonwealth v. Danish, 279 Pa. Super. 140, 420 A.2d 1071, 1074 
(1980) . £&& aififi State v, Sam. 510 P.2d 978 (Okl. Crim 1973) . 
To hold otherwise, would unnecessari ly add t o the c o s t s and delay 
in the administrat ion of criminal j u s t i c e . See. Hathorne v. 
jStaifir 549 S.W.2d 826, 833 (Tex. Crim. 1970) , ££r£. dsnifiLdr 402 
U.S. 914. Indeed, numerous courts have held that 
d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n i s not required even in those cases where the 
judge had personal ly prosecuted the defendant on a prior felony 
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conviction which provided the basis for the habitual criminal 
charge pending before the court. £*£*. State v. Warner. 649 
S.W.2d 580 (Tenn. 1980); People v. Potter. 115 Mich. App. 125, 
320 N.W.2d 313 (1982). Although this Court has suggested that it 
would ordinarily be better practice for a judge to disqualify 
himself or herself upon the filing of an affidavit of bias and 
prejudice, even though the judge may be entirely free of those 
detractors, Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 
(1948), the majority view outlined above is not inconsistent with 
the Court's rulings in this area. £&& State v. Byington. 114 
Utah 388, 200 P.2d 723 (1948); Musser v. Third Judicial Dist. 
Court, Etc. . 106 Utah 373, 148 P.2d 802 (1944). 
When viewed against this backdrop, Judge Banks refusal 
to disqualify himself was not error. His involvement as the 
authorizing signature on informations filed against Belt, a duty 
of his office of district attorney, and a personal appearance at 
Belt's arraignment in one case, long prior to the instant case, 
simply did not require recusal—as a matter of law or discretion. 
There being no showing of actual bias or prejudice at their 
trial, defendants1 claim regarding recusal is without merit. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSALS OF 
THEIR CONVICTIONS ON THE GROUND THAT THEY 
WERE NOT PROVIDED A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF 
THEIR PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
Defendants argue that, because a recording malfunction 
during their preliminary hearing in circuit court prevented them 
from having a complete transcript of that hearing at trial, they 
were unable to cross-examine effectively the State1s chief 
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witness, and therefore they are e n t i t l e d to reversa l s of the i r 
convictions* 
Although the Sta te agrees with defendants t ha t they 
were e n t i t l e d to a complete preliminary hearing t r a n s c r i p t in 
order to prepare for t he i r defense a t t r i a l , 3&S. State v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980) (observing that one of 
the anc i l l a ry purposes of the preliminary hearing i s to provide 
the defendant with information for preparing a defense a t t r i a l ) ; 
Gardner v. United Statesr 407 F.2d 1266, 1267 (D .C . Cir. 1969), 
j2£I_t^ deniedP 395 U.S. 911, they are obliged to demonstrate 
prejudice before reversal i s required for f a i l u re to remand the 
case for another preliminary hearing. SLS& Gardner, 407 F.2d a t 
1267; Wright v. S t a t e . 505 P.2d 507, 511 (Okl. Crim. 1973); SJtaifi 
v, Sco t t . 11 Ariz. App. 68, 461 P.2d 712, 714 (1970). Defendants 
merely speculate that there may have been inconsis tencies between 
David B i t t n e r ' s preliminary hearing testimony and his testimony 
t r i a l , beyond h is admitted misrepresentat ion of fact a t 
preliminary hearing concerning monetary compensation for h is 
testimony. Mere speculation should not be enough to e s t ab l i sh 
prejudice . ££* State V. Langley, 25 Utah 2d 29, 474 P.2d 737, 
738 (1970); Sta te v. L i t t l e . 19 Utah 2d 53, 426 P.2d 4 , 5 (1967). 
And, because defendants ful ly cross-examined Bi t tner a t t r i a l 
without a complete preliminary hearing t r a n s c r i p t , bringing out 
numerous fac t s tha t the jury could have viewed as impeaching his 
testimony, no prejudice was evident . ite£ Jones v. S t a t e . 3 Kan. 
App. 578, 598 P.2d 565, 570 (1979). Therefore, the absence of a 
complete t r ansc r ip t and the t r i a l cour t 1 s denial of defendants' 
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motion to remand do not require reversal of defendants' 
convictions. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE DEFENDANTS DID NOT REQUEST A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION ON CRIMINAL 
TRESPASS FOR THE BURGLARY CHARGE, THEY ARE 
PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING ON APPEAL THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO GIVE SUCH 
AN INSTRUCTION; ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANTS 
WERE NOT ENTITLED TO THAT INSTRUCTION. 
At trial, defendants requested several criminal 
trespass instructions; however, they referred to the charge of 
criminal trespass alleged to have occurred on March 20, 1983, not 
to the charge of burglary alleged to have occurred on April 11, 
1983 (see Defendants1 Requested Instructions at R. 169-72, 192-
95). The trial gave those requested instructions in substance 
(Instruction Nos. 24-27; R. 224-29). Although defense counsel 
appeared to object to the court's failure to give a lesser 
included offense in s t ruc t ion on criminal t respass for the 
burglary charge, the record r e f l e c t s some confusion on t h i s 
point—in both the cour t ' s and counse l ' s minds (R. 880-81) . I t 
does not appear that counsel adequately resolve the quest ion of 
whether defendants had in fac t requested the l e s s e r included 
ins truc t ions t o which the ir exceptions pertained (R. 881) . 
Because the record does not r e f l e c t a request for the 
i n s t r u c t i o n s defendants now claim were improperly denied, they 
are precluded from ra i s ing that i s sue on appeal. State v. Evans. 
668 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983) ("Generally, for a party to be in a 
p o s i t i o n to complain of the t r i a l cour t ' s f a i l u r e to g ive an 
i n s t r u c t i o n , he must f i r s t propose the ins truc t ion and then take 
except ion t o the cour t ' s refusal to give i t . " ) 
- 1 1 -
Even if it were assumed that defendants preserved the 
lesser included issue for reviewf they were not entitled to a 
criminal trespass instruction on the burglary charge. As was the 
case in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), where the Court 
upheld the trial court's refusal to give a lesser included 
offense instruction on criminal trespass in a burglary 
prosecution, defendants fail to point to any evidence that would 
support a conviction under the portions of the criminal trespass 
statute that they rely upon. £££ Brief of Appellants at 19. 
Defendants argued at trial that they were at Spectra Symbol on 
April 11 to assist David Bittner in removing his marijuana from a 
locker, with the belief that Bittner, and they through Bittner, 
had permission to be on the premises. The thrust of defendants' 
evidence was to negate any criminal intent, not to prove the 
existence of one of the intents necessary for criminal trespass. 
Defendants sought to convince the jury that they were at Spectra 
Symbol on April 11 for an innocent purpose and under the mistaken 
belief that they had permission to be there. In fact, pursuant 
to their request, the court instructed the jury that "Iain act 
committed under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves 
any criminal intent is not a crime." Instruction No. 19 
(R. 221); Defendants' Requested Instruction No. 1 (R. 187). 
Therefore, because the evidence did not provide both a "rational 
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant[s] of the offense 
charged and convicting [them] of the included offense," UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 76-1-402(4) (1978), and defendants' own theory of the case 
precluded the giving of a lesser included instruction, the trial 
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court did not err in denying defendants' requested instruction, 
assuming the instruction was actually before the court. fiaJsjgjc, 
671 P.2d at 160; State v. Shabata. 678 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah 1984). 
POINT IV 
REVERSIBLE ERROR DID NOT OCCUR WHEN THE TRIAL 
COURT REFUSED TO GIVE DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION REGARDING ACCOMPLICE 
TESTIMONY. 
The trial court refused to give defendants' requested 
cautionary instruction regarding accomplice testimony (R. 185). 
Defendants contend that this was reversible error. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-7 (1982) provides: 
(1) A conviction may be had on the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the courtf an 
instruction to the jury may be given to the 
effect that such uncorroborated testimony 
should be viewed with caution, and such an 
instruction shall be given if the trial judge 
finds the testimony of the accomplice to be 
self contradictory, uncertain or improbable. 
Under this statute, the trial court may, in its discretion, give 
a cautionary ins truct ion when an accomplice's testimony i s 
uncorroborated. Such an ins truc t ion i s required only i f the 
testimony i s "se l f - contrad ic tory , uncertain or improbable." 
Defendants fail to demonstrate that either of the prerequisites 
for a cautionary accomplice ins truc t ion e x i s t e d in t h e i r cases . 
F i r s t , David B i t t n e r ' s testimony as to both the March 20th 
criminal t respass charge and the April 11th burglary and the f t 
charges was corroborated by the testimony of numerous wi tnesses , 
including the recept ion i s t at Spectra Symbol, i t s owner and 
manager, and several po l i ce o f f i c e r s (R. 491-670) . Second, even 
i f i t were assumed that B i t t n e r ' s testimony was uncorroborated, 
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the t r i a l court could have reasonably determined that the 
testimony was not s e l f - contrad ic tory , uncertain, or improbable. 
Defendants' argument that B i t t n e r ' s t r i a l testimony was s e l f -
contradictory because he admitted that certa in port ions of i t 
were incons i s t en t with h i s "perjured" preliminary hearing 
testimony i s not persuasive . Incons i s t enc i e s with prior 
testimony did not render B i t t n e r ' s statements at t r i a l s e l f -
contradictory; they merely indicated d i f ferences between prior 
and present testimony. Defendants' further contention that 
B i t t n e r ' s perjured preliminary hearing testimony regarding the 
question of compensation, coupled with c o n f l i c t s between h i s and 
defendants' testimony at t r i a l , made B i t t n e r ' s testimony 
uncertain and improbable, i s equally unpersuasive. Simply 
because B i t t n e r ' s story was d i f f erent from defendants' did not 
make i t uncertain or improbable. Indeed, by arguing testimony in 
c o n f l i c t with their own as a bas i s for concluding that B i t t n e r ' s 
testimony was uncertain or improbable, defendants could not 
l o g i c a l l y escape that conclusion with respect t o the ir own 
testimony—an argument they surely do not wish to advance in t h i s 
Court. In sum, no v i o l a t i o n of § 77-17-7 i s apparent here, and 
defendants do not appear to have suffered any prejudice because a 
cautionary i n s t r u c t i o n was not g iven. SL&& S tate v. Woodf 648 
P.2d 71 , 91 (Utah 1982) , JC£U^ dfijiiad, 459 U.S. 988. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendants1 
convic t ions should be affirmed. 
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